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THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM UNDER THE
MONTANA CONSTITUTION
Betsy Griffing*
State constitutions have come into their own with respect to protecting
individual constitutional rights. Professor Robert Williams has recently de-
tailed the rise, if not prominence, of the New Judicial Federalism in the
states' highest courts.' The New Judicial Federalism recognizes that the
United States Constitution is the baseline or the starting point for many
basic freedoms, and state courts now commonly turn to state constitutions
to support broader protections for such freedoms. 2 Beginning in the mid-
1980's, and until a few years ago, the Montana Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the Montana Constitution was no exception.3 In recent years, how-
ever, the Montana Supreme Court appears reticent to recognize broader pro-
tections under the Montana Constitution, except when the express right of
privacy in Article II, Section 10 comes into play.4 The enthusiasm for the
broader protections afforded under the Montana Constitution appears to
have unfortunately reached its zenith in the 1990s. The Montana Supreme
Court has gone out of its way recently to "march lock-step" with interpreta-
tions of the United States Constitution5 or has resorted to strained statutory
or common law interpretations in order to avoid constitutional interpretation
when asked to clarify broader protections. 6
* Legal Director of the ACLU of Montana and an Adjunct Professor at the University of Montana
School of Law, where she has taught Montana Constitutional Law for the past six years.
1. Robert F. Williams, The Law of American State Constitutions, 113-133 (Oxford U. Press
2009).
2. Id. at 113-114 (citing G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions 161-170 (Princeton U.
Press 1999)
3. See listing in Snetsinger v. Mont. Univ. Sys., 104 P.3d 445, 457 (Mont. 2004) (Nelson, J.,
specially concurring).
4. See State v. Goetz, 191 P.3d 489 (Mont. 2008) (recognizing the special protections afforded
under the Montana Constitution with respect to privacy in communications and electronic surveillance
in conversations).
5. Buhman v. State, 201 P.3d 70, 92-93 (Mont. 2008) (applying 5th Amendment analysis to the
interpretation of Article H, section 29 of the Montana Constitution); State v. Schneider, 197 P.3d 1020,
1023-1029 (Mont. 2008) (applying 6th Amendment analysis to the interpretation of Article I, section
24 of the Montana Constitution).
6. Sunburst School Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco Inc., 165 P. 3d 1079, 1093 (Mont. 2007) (avoiding
discussion of whether the right to a clean and healthful environment in Article H, § 3 and Article IX is
self-executing); Baxter v. State, 354 Mont. 234, 10, - P.3d _ (Mont. 2009) (the court avoided
constitutional discussion on death with dignity).
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I. THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM IN THE DRAFTING
OF THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION
When the constitutional convention delegates met for their first organi-
zation meeting on November 29, 1971, Governor Forrest Anderson urged
the delegates to establish a strong state constitution that would be an effec-
tive balance to the growing authority of the federal government. Governor
Anderson said to the delegates:
In this century, the balance of power within the American federal system has
been distorted. The states have failed to act-too often because of constitu-
tional restrictions-and the Federal Government has been forced to exercise
the needed authority.
This has occurred in Montana and every other state in the Union. And if the
decline of the states within the national system continues, they will become
nothing more than federal subdivisions. We must not allow this to hap-
pen....
If this Convention does not revitalize our state government, and give it the
authority to act and solve problems, it may be one step further in the decline
of the federal system, and the destiny of Montana will be decided in Washing-
ton D.C.'
The delegates were charged with the duty to create a constitution that would
not be a mere reflection of the United States Constitution, but rather some-
thing more, a strong state constitution that would counterbalance the broad
reach of federal authority and reflect the values and special qualities of
Montana.
In Study Paper No. 10 which provided Constitutional Convention dele-
gates with a background on civil liberties, Rick Applegate outlined the ten-
sion between the state and federal constitutions, and noted that in this ten-
sion states are encouraged to provide more than the minimum safeguards in
the federal constitution. Applegate wrote:
Whatever the extent of federal dominance in civil liberties field, it is impor-
tant to remember that the federally enunciated standards are only minimum
safeguard. The states are free-and have been encouraged by the U.S. Su-
preme Court-to go beyond the federal standards at any point where it is
believed that citizens might better be protected.8
Applegate went on to stress that the civil liberties in the state constitution
were not restricted by merely rephrasing the rights in the federal constitu-
tion, but that "the states could function to test a number of potential new
rights-a function quite difficult, if not impossible, at the federal level." 9
Challenged by Governor Anderson, and informed by Applegate's study pa-
7. 3 Montana Constitutional Convention 3 (1972).
8. Rick Applegate, Constitutional Convention Study No. 10, Bill of Rights 3 (1972) (emphasis in
original).
9. Id. at 4.
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per, the delegates were handed the opportunity to be "little laboratories"
and could "set examples for each other and for the federal government by
testing these rights in their smaller jurisdictions without having to set in
motion the somewhat unwieldy and awesome federal amendment proce-
dures. In this way, the states could fulfill a function that they lost over
time: the vigorous enforcement and extension of safeguards of civil lib-
erty."'o
In this spirit of recognizing that they were not bound by the parameters
of the federal constitution in granting broader and even new civil liberties,
the delegates adopted sweeping provisions that hold little resemblance to
the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution. There are seventeen
express provisions in Article II, the Declaration of Rights, that have no
express counterpart in the United States Constitution." These sweeping
provisions are not just reflective of broader protections individually, but
also reflect an overall attitude of convention delegates that the Montana
Constitution was not intended to mirror the United States Constitution when
viewed as a whole.
Several cases from the Montana Supreme Court have recognized that
the Montana Constitution stands for broader protections than those under
the United States Constitution. Those cases are hallmarks of jurisprudence
in Montana, which can be referred to collectively as the "Golden Age of the
New Judicial Federalism" and should not be disregarded. They are valua-
ble models of approach, construction and interpretation that accurately seize
the original promise of the 1972 Constitution. Without using such models,
the Montana Constitution is relegated to the stagnant backwater where it
serves only as a reflection of the United States Constitution, and its promise
cannot be realized. 12
10. Id. at 4, 56.
11. Larry M. Elison & Fritz Snyder, The Montana State Constitution: A Reference Guide 20
(Greenwood Press 2001).
12. The preamble to the Montana Constitution states that the purpose of the new constitution is "to
improve the quality of life, equality of opportunity and to secure the blessings of liberty for this and
future generations. . . ." This focus was intended to guide future interpretations of the Constitution to
meet the needs and requirements far beyond what the delegates themselves could foresee. There are
numerous examples of such intent throughout the minutes of the Constitutional Convention. Constitu-
tional Convention President Leo Graybill read some quotes from delegates at the beginning of the Con-
stitutional Convention describing the purpose of the convention. At the outset of the convention, Presi-
dent Graybill quoted Delegate Thomas Joyce as saying: "It is my view that the Convention cannot and
should not try to solve any contemporary governmental problems. Rather, its purpose is to facilitate the
future solution of contemporary problems as well as problems not presently foreseeable." 3 Montana
Constitutional Convention 111. When the right to clean and healthful environment was amended into
the inalienable rights provision in Art. II, §3, Delegate Burkhardt stated that the reason he proposed the
amendment was because "[the right to clean and healthful environment] is, for the time which we're
living and for the foreseeable future, on of the inalicanable right that we hope to assure for posteriety."
5 Constitutional Convention 1637. The document was intended to be a living document interpreted as
3852010
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II. THE "GOLDEN AGE" OF THE NEW JUDICIAL
FEDERALISM IN MONTANA
In Butte Community Union v. Lewis,13 the Montana Supreme Court
recognized that constitutional interpretations by the United States Supreme
Court did not control their decisions which granted heightened protections
under the Montana Constitution. The Butte Community Court stated, "We
will not be bound by decisions of the United States Supreme Court where
independent state grounds exist for developing heightened and expanded
rights under our state constitution."' 4 The Court unequivocally recognized
the principles of the New Judicial Federalism and emphasized that broader
protections may be found under the state constitution even when the "state
constitutional language is substantially similar to the language of the Fed-
eral Constitution."' 5
Using this expansive interpretation of Montana's own constitution, the
Court in Butte Community Union defined "fundamental right" under the
Montana Constitution. The Court stated that "In order to be fundamental, a
necessary to preserve and expand upon the rights and liberties in the Constitution. For example, Dele-
gate Burkhardt, in advocating for a broad statement to describe the right of public participation, Art. II,
§ 8, rather than the "hard language of the statute", stated "What [people are looking for] is the soul of a
document, the living, growing reality" that would be a future "safety net" against government abuses.
Delegate Campbell, in advocating for the express right of privacy in Art. II, § 10, paraphrased Delegate
Dahood and noted that the right of privacy was a flexible concept designed to address government
abuses as they arose. He stated, "As government functions and controls expand, it is necessary to
expand the rights of the individual." 5 Constitutional Convention 1681.
13. Butte Community Union v. Lewis, 712 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Mont. 1986), superseded, Mont. Const.
amend. 18.
14. Id. at 1313. A primary reason for following the principles of New Judicial Federalism is not
only to provide more expansive protections under the state constitution, but also to provide an "adequate
and independent" state ground for the decisions of the state's highest court. Only when a state's highest
court relies upon such adequate and independent state grounds, such as those found in a state constitu-
tion, will the United States Supreme Court defer to the interpretation of the state's highest court. Mich.
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1033 (1983).
15. Butte Community Union, 712 P.2d at 1313 (citing Pfost v. State, 713 P.2d 495, 500 (1985),
overruled on other grounds, Meech v. Hillhaven W. Inc., 776 P.2d 488 (Mont. 1989)). In Pfost, the
Court stated:
Art. II, § 4, of our State Constitution provides in part "no person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws. Mont. Const. art. II, § 4. That provision of our State Constitution,
though similar in wording to the last clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution provides a separate ground on which rights of persons within this state may be
founded, and under accepted principles of constitutional law such rights must be at least the
same as and may be greater than rights founded on the federal clause. Thus, states may inter-
pret their own constitutions to afford greater protections than the Supreme Court of the United
States has recognized in its interpretations of the federal counterparts to state constitutions. ...
Federal rights are considered minimal and a state constitution may be more demanding than
the equivalent federal constitutional provision. This is true even though our state constitu-
tional language is substantially similar to the language of the Federal Constitution.
[Internal citations omitted.]
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right must be found within Montana's Declaration of Rights [Article II] or
be a right 'without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would
have little meaning."" 6 By adopting such a definition of fundamental
right, the Court recognized that federal constitutional precedent would have
little sway over state constitutional interpretations.
For example, the Montana Supreme Court has recognized that the ex-
press right of privacy in Art. II, § 1017 goes beyond any such personal au-
tonomy or liberty interests in the United States Constitution. In Gryczan v.
State,18 the Court invalidated the Montana statute criminalizing homosexual
conduct long before the United States Supreme Court did in Lawrence v.
Texas.19 Interestingly, in Gryczan, the Court used an analytical framework
derived from the leading federal case on privacy in communications 20 to
invalidate the statute, reasoning that people fully expect their consensual
sexual activities will be private and that "while society may not approve,"
this is not to say that society would be unwilling to recognize that all adults,
regardless of gender or marital state have a reasonable expectation that their
sexual activities will remain private.21 Although the Court adopted the lan-
guage of the Katz test, it actually applied the test in a new way-not to
informational privacy, but to personal autonomy privacy, and thereby ex-
panded the personal autonomy liberty interest under the Montana Constitu-
tion.
In Armstrong v. State,22 the Court clarified the nature of the liberty
interest first enunciated in Gryzcan and upheld a woman's right to choose
the healthcare provider who would perform an abortion. In Armstrong, Jus-
tice Nelson, writing for the majority, introduced another important construct
of the Montana Constitution. The Court stated that "Montana's Constitu-
tion, and especially the Declaration of Rights [Art. II] encompasses a cohe-
sive set of principles, carefully drafted and committed to an abstract ideal of
a just government. It is a compact of overlapping and redundant rights."23
While the Court relied primarily on the personal autonomy in the right of
privacy in Article II § 10, the Court went on to list the many different provi-
16. Butte Community Union, 712 P.2d at 1113 (quoting In the Matter of C.H., 683 P.2d 931, 940
(Mont. 1984)).
17. "The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be
infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest." Mont. Const. art. II, § 10.
18. Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997).
19. See Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S 558 (2003).
20. The Court relies upon Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967), and its two-part analysis of (1)
whether the individual has an actual or subjective expectation of privacy and (2) whether that expecta-
tion is one society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Gryzcan, 914 P.2d at 121-122.
21. Gryzcan, 914 P.2d at 122.
22. 989 P.2d 365 (Mont. 1999).
23. Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 388-389 (referencing Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion 166 (Vintage
1994)).
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sions under Article H that would support such a liberty interest. This con-
cept-that there are many rights, not just the right of privacy, that could be
used to support an individual right-established a new foundation for con-
stitutional interpretation in Montana. It suggests that the Montana Constitu-
tion should be viewed holistically; there are intertwining and corollary
rights that support the ideal of a just government. Constitutional interpreta-
tion should not be focused on the dissecting of each provision, but rather
based upon a construct where the individual rights are viewed in relation to
each other. This construct led the Court to yet another important construct
where separate provisions in Article II would actually operate to enhance or
augment each other.2 4
The notion that two provisions could be read together to create a new
or broader protection than if the rights were read separately had occurred
previously. In State v. Bullock,2 5 the Court rejected application of the fed-
eral open fields doctrine, and looked to both the right of privacy in Art. II,
§ 10 and to the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures in
Art. II, § 11. In Bullock, the question before the Court was whether a game
warden illegally seized an elk which he found hanging in the curtilage of a
mountain cabin. Focusing on the personal nature of the right of privacy
rather than the property analysis previously associated with curtilage analy-
sis, the Court relied on the Katz test again. The Court reasoned that such an
approach was warranted because § 10 and § 11 of Article II, must be read
together when search and seizure cases are analyzed. 2 6 This reading of one
provision to support another provided justification for the Court not to
march "lock-step" with the United States Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Under this analysis of § 10 and § 11, the Court was essentially using
one right in Article II as a "building block" for another in order to create a
right that was broader than that provided under the United States Constitu-
tion. The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures under the
24. This holistic approach is different from that examined by Professor Neuborne. Under Prof.
Neuborne's proposal, the United States Constitution should be read "as a structural whole" and not reach
each provision as a "self-contained command" in "splendid isolation." Burt Nueborne, The House was
Quiet and the World was Calm the Reader Became the Book, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 2007, 2014 (2004).
Professor Neubome's thesis is that "an organizing principle undergirds the Bill of Rights-an organiz-
ing principle unique in our rights-bearing tradition that, once acknowledged, helps to give coherent
meaning to the components that make up the whole." Id. at 2016. Professor Neuborne advocates for
viewing the United States Constitution holistically rather than reading "our most precious legal docu-
ment as though the Founders had thrown a pot of ink at the wall, with the formal order of the Bill of
Rights shaped by the splatter." Id. at 2015. Justice Nelson's approach, in contrast, is that the rights in
Article II's Declaration of Rights are overlapping, but different provisions could be used to support the
same liberty or personal autonomy interest.
25. State v. Bullock, 901 P.2d 61 (Mont. 1995).
26. In State v. Goetz, 191 P.3d 489, 496 (Mont. 2008), the Court reinforced and acknowledged its
reading of §§ 10 and 11 in search and seizure cases.
388 Vol. 71
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Montana Constitution would be analyzed by looking to not only § 11, but
also § 10, and the combination of these two provisions offered a heightened
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Court expanded on this "building block" approach later in Walker
v. State,2 7 where the Court used the right of human dignity in Article I, § 4
to enhance or augment the protection against cruel and unusual punishment
in Article II, § 22. In Walker, the Court stated: "Just as we read the privacy
provision in the Montana Constitution in conjunction with the provisions
regarding search and seizure to provide Montanans with greater protections
from government intrusion, so too do we read the dignity provision of the
Montana Constitution together with Article II § 22 to provide Montana citi-
zens greater protections from cruel and unusual punishment than does the
federal constitution." 28
The Court's holding and analysis in Walker was an important step in
Montana jurisprudence for several reasons. First, it recognized that the
presence of the right of human dignity in Article II, § 4 operated to "com-
plement" a separate constitutional right. 29 Secondly, it picked up the holis-
tic approach in Armstrong and incorporated that concept with this building
block approach. Whereas in Armstrong the Court saw that a number of
provisions in the Montana Constitution could support a liberty interest, in
Walker the Court recognized that the right to individual dignity could simi-
larly protect an incarcerated inmate. But the right to individual dignity
would not operate in a vacuum-instead, it operates in concert with the
protection against cruel and unusual punishment to provide a heightened or
enhanced right.
The building block analysis in the search and seizure cases and in
Walker serve an important function in three ways. First, they provide a
rational and logical basis for the Montana Supreme Court to follow the
precepts of New Judicial Federalism. The expansive structure of the Mon-
tana Constitution and the listing of new rights focusing on the dignity, pri-
vacy and integrity of an individual should be taken into account each time a
provision in the Montana Constitution is considered. The Montana Consti-
tution is not a mirror of the United States Constitution and should not be
treated as such. Secondly, this building block approach provides an ade-
quate and independent state ground for the decisions of the Montana Su-
preme Court, thereby insulating it from federal scrutiny. Lastly, the build-
27. Walker v. State, 68 P.3d 872 (Mont. 2003).
28. Id. at 883.
29. See Matthew 0. Clifford & Thomas P. Huff, Some Thoughts on the Meaning and Scope of the
Montana Constitution's "Dignity" Clause with Possible Applications, 61 Mont. L. Rev. 301, 328
(2000).
2010 389
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ing block construct provides the framework for a vibrant laboratory in the
preservation of civil liberties.
IRl. RETREATING FROM HEIGHTENED PROTECTIONS UNDER
THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION
Despite this earlier willingness to test and implement the new language
in the Montana Constitution, the Montana Supreme Court has retreated in
recent years to a reliance upon federal precedent. Two examples of the
Court relying upon federal precedent rather than employing an analysis that
fits the language and intent of the Montana Constitution are Buhman v.
State,30 and State v. Schnieder.31
In Buhman, the Court debated the takings clause in Article II, § 29 and
rejected granting broader protections under the Montana provision than
under the Fifth Amendment, despite a difference in language. The Court
stated that the "taking" of private property under Article II, § 29 is "coex-
tensive" with the protection under the Fifth Amendment and that the con-
trolling federal precedent was to be used in applying a takings claim under
either the Montana Constitution or the United States Constitution. 32
Justice Nelson in his dissent in Buhman appealed to the Court to read
the Constitutional Convention transcript "as a whole" and not dissect each
separate provision. He argued that the delegates passing reference to the
United States Constitution does not restrict the Court to strict reliance on
federal precedent.33 Justice Nelson went on to list those special protections
of the Montana Constitution, showing how and why reliance upon federal
precedent is not warranted by the either text or the intent of the framers. He
stated, "One cannot read the transcripts of the debates without recognizing
that Montana's Constitution is a progressive constitution." 3 4 The Court
nonetheless rejected Justice Nelson's approach and decided to march lock-
step with the United States Supreme Court in takings cases.
Similar to the Court's decision in Buhman, the Court in State v. Sch-
nieder appeared to go out of its way to reject the granting of heightened
protections under the Montana Constitution and turn away from the princi-
ples of New Judicial Federalism. In Schneider, the Court reviewed an indi-
vidual's right to counsel under Article II, § 24 and stated that it would look
to federal precedent unless the minutes of the Constitutional Convention
expressly indicated the courts should not follow such precedent.
30. Buhman, 201 P.3d 70.
31. Schneider, 197 P.3d 1020.
32. Buhman, 201 P.3d at 85-86.
33. Id. at 108.
34. Id.
390 Vol. 71
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This interpretation in Schneider was a distinct break from the previous
approach of the Court. Since 1986, the Court, relying upon the reasoning in
Butte Community Union, had recognized that even when language in the
Montana Constitution was identical or nearly so to its counterpart in the
federal constitution, the Montana Constitution still provided a separate and
enforceable provision and that the state constitutional right should be ana-
lyzed before the federal claim.35 In Schneider, however, the Court went out
of its way to "march lock-step" with the United States Supreme Court. Jus-
tice Nelson pointed out in his concurrence in Schneider that the parties had
not really raised or briefed the right to counsel under the Montana Constitu-
tion.36 There was no need to address the application of the Montana Consti-
tution at all. The majority of the Court nonetheless raised the issue of
whether broader protections should be afforded under the Montana Consti-
tution and then rejected it, signaling perhaps that the Golden Age of New
Judicial Federalism is over in Montana.
IV. AVOIDING CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION IF POSSIBLE
In two recent cases where the Court was asked by the parties to find
heightened protections under the Montana Constitution, the Montana Su-
preme Court avoided addressing the application of the Montana Constitu-
tion by relying upon either common law principles or statutory interpreta-
tion. In Sunburst School District v. Texaco, Inc.,3 the parties were asked to
brief and present oral argument on the issue of whether or not the right to a
clean and healthful environment under the Montana Constitution was self-
executing.38 If it was self-executing, then the parties could look to that
provision as a basis for damages in constitutional tort. Despite lengthy
briefing and oral argument, the Court ultimately avoided the issue by adopt-
ing a Restatement on Torts position that would allow damages. 39 The Court
had a perfect opportunity, however, to recognize the unique and expansive
nature of the right to a clean and healthful environment, and chose not to do
so.
35. State v. Johnson, 719 P.2d 1248 (Mont. 1986). Although the Johnson Court described the right
to counsel, the Montana Supreme Court later recognized that it was actually the privilege against self-
incrimination, as protected by the right to counsel in Article H, § 25. Despite this discrepancy, the
overall approach of the Court in Johnson to the Montana Constitution was later acknowledged as cor-
rect. See State v. Buck, 134 P.3d 53 (Mont. 2006).
36. Schneider, 197 P.3d 1020, 1030 (J. Nelson, specially concurring).
37. Sunburst Sch. Dist., 165 P.3d 1079.
38. See Article II, § 3 and Article IX.
39. Sunburst Sch. Dist., 165 P.3d at 1092-1093. The Court notes specifically that because it had
adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts § 929 to allow for recovery of restoration of damages it was not
necessary to address the issue of whether there was a constitutional tort.
2010 391
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Similarly, in Baxter v. State,4 0 the parties briefed and presented oral
arguments to the Court on whether or not there was a right to death with
dignity under the Montana Constitution. Extensive briefing was provided
by amici on both sides of the issue, and oral argument focused on the mean-
ing of the right to human dignity in Article II, § 4, and the personal auton-
omy rights in Article II, § 10. The issue in Baxter was whether or not
Montana's homicide statute was constitutional as it applied to physicians
who provided to competent, terminally ill patients a prescription that would
cause death and which the patients would self-administer.
The district court had held in Baxter that the homicide statute was
unconstitutional. The district court looked to the Montana Supreme Court's
analysis in Armstrong and in Walker, and applied the holistic approach and
building block analysis contained in those decisions. The district court read
the right of human dignity in Article II, § 4 together with the right of pri-
vacy in Article II, § 10, and concluded that there was a right to death with
dignity under the Montana Constitution. Holding a physician criminally
liable for a patient's choice to terminate his or her life with medication
provided by the physician violated that death with dignity. The district
court's decision reflected the application of New Judicial Federalism during
its Golden Age in Montana.
The Montana Supreme Court in Baxter refused, however, to apply the
Montana Constitution. The Court instead analyzed the consent defense to
homicide and stated that it was not a violation of public policy for physi-
cians to use that defense if they prescribed medication to terminally ill,
competent patients. The Court also upheld the constitutionality of Mon-
tana's Terminally Ill Act, although its constitutionality had not been chal-
lenged by the parties.
Baxter and Sunburst School District signal a potentially disturbing
trend. While these cases do not reject outright the potential for recognition
of fundamental rights under the Montana Constitution, they simply avoid
the issue and leave it for another day. Presumably, this is the result of
compromise on the Court, but it certainly suggests that a current majority is
neither willing nor able to apply the heightened protections under the Mon-
tana Constitution.
V. CONCLUSION
The Montana Constitution was intended as a living document to pro-
tect future generations. It was designed to broadly meet those government
intrusions that infringe upon our individual liberties and allow for full relief
for violation of our constitutional rights. It is an expansive, not a restric-
40. 224 P.3d 1211.
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tive, document. During the Golden Age of New Judicial Federalism in
Montana, individual rights were recognized and protected. Recent trends
suggest, however, that this Golden Age is over. The delegates to the 1972
Montana Constitutional Convention were a courageous and forward-look-
ing group. Hopefully, the Montana judiciary will recognize, as it has in the
past, the unique protections for individual liberties that the delegates envi-
sioned.
11
Griffing: The New Judicial Federalism
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2010
12
Montana Law Review, Vol. 71 [2010], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol71/iss2/5
